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Abstract – A classical multilayer perceptron 
algorithm and novel convolutional neural 
network payload classifying algorithm are 
presented for use on a realistic network in-
trusion detection dataset. The payload classi-
fying algorithm is judged to be inferior to the 
multilayer perceptron but shows significance 
in being able to distinguish between network 
intrusions and benign traffic. The multilayer 
perceptron that is trained on less than 1% of 
the available classification data is judged to 
be a good modern estimate of usage in the 
real-world when compared to prior research. 
It boasts an average true positive rate of 




As the internet continues to expand its us-
erbase and becomes more and more synony-
mous with daily life, the threat of malicious 
traffic gains the possibility of becoming 
much greater in volume and more debilitating 
to home and commercial networks. Defend-
ing against this malicious traffic requires a 
suite of tools that will allow network admin-
istrators to detect, block, capture, and analyze 
the malicious streams that traverse their net-
works with high accuracy and speed.  
One component of such a suite is known 
as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), 
which is a tool for actively or retroactively 
detecting malicious streams within a body of 
traffic. These systems are usually meant to 
comprehensively identify any traffic that is 
unwanted by the network administrator and is 
generated within the network or sent from the 
outside. Examples include denial of service 
attacks, botnet traffic, heartbleed attacks, 
cross-site scripting attacks, worms, buffer 
overflow attacks, port scans, data exfiltration, 
and even malicious binary file transfers.  
Two examples of commonly used IDS’s 
are Cisco’s Snort and the open-source Bro 
IDS [1][2]. These systems use techniques like 
generating signatures of known malicious 
files and having network security experts 
come up with rigidly defined rules for what 
constitutes malicious traffic. Signatures are 
generated automatically and matched against 
files that are extracted from network traffic, 
and rules include things like blacklisting cer-
tain IP addresses within or outside of the net-
work, searching internet packet payloads for 
certain strings or regular expressions, and 
checking for combinations of metadata in in-
ternet packet headers that should never occur 
in legitimate traffic. Although both are effec-
tive, in actual use, signatures can only defend 
against exact replicas of known malware, and 
there can easily be hundreds of rules that need 
to be handwritten and tested. So, signatures 
cannot defend against differently coded ver-
sions of the same malware, zero-day attacks, 
and amorphous malware, which can alter its 
code, and new rules need to be created as new 
attack vectors are found, which constitutes a 
great commitment of time and expertise.  
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To improve upon these systems, a com-
monly researched approach is to classify net-
work traffic at the session level by extracting 
a number of features from each session and 
using these features as the input to a machine 
learning (ML) algorithm like a random forest, 
support vector machine, bayesian network, or 
neural network [3][4][5]. The most success-
ful ones are based on specific neural net-
works known as multilayer perceptrons 
(MLPs) and boast impressive accuracies of 
over 98% true positives and less than 1% 
false positives on the 2015 UNSW-NB15 da-
taset [6][7][8]. These accuracies, however, 
are suspect because the authors of [6] and [7] 
respectively use a staggering 90% and 70% 
of their datasets for training purposes and 
only evaluate their classifiers on the remain-
ing 10% and 30%. Such results can be con-
sidered proofs-of-concept because they show 
that there is something that an MLP can learn 
from the input features to accurately predict a 
realistic subset of internet traffic. However, 
when this is thought of in a real-world con-
text, it is not reasonable to assume that a net-
work administrator will have access to over 
50% of benign or malicious internet traffic 
for training.  
For this reason, this paper presents simi-
lar experiments of MLP classification on net-
work traffic with considerably smaller por-
tions of the dataset allocated to training 
(>1%). A newer IDS dataset known as CI-
CIDS2017 has also been chosen to evaluate 
the classifiers because it is significantly more 
recent and appears to be more representative 
of realistic traffic [4].  
Most of the features for the MLP classi-
fier were based on header features that have 
been shown to have an effective impact on 
network traffic classification [9]. However, 
experiments were also run with an additional 
feature that is analogous to what has been 
presented in other research as an effective 
classifier of network traffic into categories 
that are different from the IDS focus pre-
sented here, like transfer protocol type and 
application type [10][11]. This feature will be 
called the payload classifier because it pre-
dicts the maliciousness of every payload of a 
particular session based only on payloads on 
which it was trained. While this payload clas-
sifier showed significance and promise by it-
self, it was unfortunately unable to improve 
upon IDS predictions when incorporated into 
the MLP classifier. 
The main contributions of this paper are 
showing that MLP IDS techniques are appli-
cable to a modern environment and providing 
a better estimate of classification accuracy 
with these techniques. It also introduces a 
technique for leveraging payload features 
that shows significance in being able to clas-
sify packets with meaningful payloads. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces this paper’s implementation 
of MLP classification. Section 3 introduces 
the application of deep convolutional neural 
networks to payload classification and how it 
can be combined with an MLP. Section 4 pre-
sents the testing methodology and results of 
using the MLP and payload classifier. And 
section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
2 The MLP IDS Classifier 
2.1 MLP Network Architecture 
The basic MLP classifier was imple-
mented in keras on top of TensorFlow and is 
a deep neural network that utilizes the Adam 
optimizer and consists of a 27-node input 
layer, which is followed by three fully con-
nected 64-node layers that each have a drop-
out probability of 0.5 and rectified linear unit 
activation, which are followed be a single-




The 27 inputs are packet header features 
extracted from .pcap files by a custom Python 
framework and are based on ones that were 
found to be successful in [9]. They include 
(1) number of TCP packets, (2) number of 
UDP packets, (3) number of ICMP packets, 
(4) number of other packets, (5) average in-
terarrival time of packets, (6) number of self-
to-self connections, (7) number of wrong 
TCP packets, (8) number of urgent TCP 
packets, (9) number of packets sent over FTP, 
(10) number of packets sent over SSH, (11) 
number of packets sent over Telnet, (12) 
number of packets sent over SMTP, (13) 
number of packets sent over DNS, (14) num-
ber of packets sent over DHCP, (15) number 
of packets sent over TFTP, (16) number of 
packets sent over HTTP, (17) number of 
packets sent over POP3, (18) number of 
packets sent over NTP, (19) number of pack-
ets sent over NetBIOS, (20) number of pack-
ets sent over IMAP3, (21) number of packets 
sent over SNMP, (22) number of packets sent 
over BGP, (23) number of packets sent over 
LDAP, (24) number of packets sent over 
HTTPS, (25) number of packets sent over 
LDAPS, (26) number of packets sent over 
FTP using TLS/SSL, and (27) number of 
packets sent over another service. Each of 
these features was extracted over an entire 
.pcap, which was preprocessed to contain 
only one 5-tuple internet session, and each 
extraction except for (5) was then divided by 
the appropriate possible upper bound of the 
feature within the session in order to alleviate 
classification bias that arises from sessions 
having different numbers of packets. For ex-
ample, the number of urgent TCP packets 
was divided by the total number of TCP pack-
ets. 
After the features for a session are ex-
tracted and run through the MLP, it produces 
a score based on its training that is in the 
range [0, 1], where 0 corresponds to the ses-
sion being benign and 1 corresponds to the 
session being malicious. A session was con-
sidered benign in practice when the output 
was below 0.5 and malicious otherwise. 
 
2.2 MLP Training 
A successful neural network classifier 
usually relies on clean and evenly sampled 
data to produce effective results, and it be-
came clear from early tests that the IDS ap-
plication is no different. Training the MLP 
classifier on unbalanced sets of benign and 
malicious examples always showed biased 
results, and even within each classification 
category, subcategories of types of benign 
and malicious traffic needed to be well bal-
anced to work effectively. 
After some testing on initial datasets, the 
following methodology was settled upon and 
relied on undersampling the training data and 
leveraging biased results. The total dataset is 
first split into malicious and benign subcate-
gories based on the dataset. Then, each sub-
category has 1% or less of its data randomly 
selected to appear in the training set; the rest 
is reserved for testing. The training data then 
has the number of benign and malicious 
streams compared; either benign or malicious 
streams are randomly removed such that the 
ratio of benign to malicious streams is 1.2:1, 
which is called undersampling because all of 
the training data is not actually being used. 
This has an advantage over other techniques 
like oversampling because all of the used data 
is still unique, and there is more benign than 
malicious training data to intentionally bias 
the classifier towards benign classifications 
since false positives can be considered a great 
limiting factor on the usefulness of an IDS 
[16]. 
 
3 The Payload Classifier 
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3.1 Payload Classifier Architecture 
The payload classifier is basically a 
heavy-duty feature that makes a prediction of 
session maliciousness based on only the 
packet payloads in a session. Its original 
presentation and testing can be found in [17] 
and will be summarized here. It is also imple-
mented in keras on top of TensorFlow and 
utilized the Adam optimizer, but it is a deep 
convolutional neural network [12][13][14]. It 
consists of a character embedding layer that’s 
followed by four convolutional and pooling 
layers that are followed by a two-classifica-
tion softmax layer as shown in Figure 1. Most 
of the parameters like number of layers, slid-
ing window size, number of kernels, activa-
tion functions, and pooling layer sizes are 
based on the designs of previous effective 
works or initial testing with a small dataset 
[10][11]. 
The embedding layer is a pre-trained 
character-to-character co-occurrence matrix 
of 257x256 values. Each encodes a vector of 
the context for each of the possible 256 val-
ues that a byte may contain, except for the last 
vector, which is maintained as a zero vector 
so that packets that are too short and input 
into the model can be padded with this 
pseudo-byte that will not contribute any fea-
tures to the convolutional layers. For pre-
training, all of the payloads from the selected 
training set have a sliding context window of 
three characters run over them, and the vector 
in the character-to-character matrix that rep-
resents the middle character is given plus one 
in weight at the index of the other characters 
seen in the window. This is the same idea as 
a word-to-word co-occurrence matrix with a 
sliding window of size three, but by using 
characters in place of words, and it relies on 
deterministically converting every byte into 
an index in the range [0, 255] based on the 
decimal value of each byte. Each vector in the 
embedding matrix, except for the last one that 
is reserved for a vector of zeros, is then nor-
malized to a magnitude of one. 
When the payload classifier is used after 
this pre-training, a payload is converted into 
a 1500x257 matrix by the embedding layer, 
which converts each character into its learned 
embedding and appends all of the embed-
dings onto each other in the same order as the 
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payload. If a payload is larger or smaller than 
1500 characters, this matrix is curtailed or 
padded with the zero vector. They should not 
be longer than this by convention as stated by 
Lotfollahi et al., so this should not highly af-
fect results [18].  
The kernels in the convolutional layers 
each span four entire character vectors and 
use rectified linear unit activation. Each of 
the four layers learns 128 kernels, and each is 
followed by a max pooling layer over four en-
tire character vectors, except for the last one 
that pools over sixteen vectors. The last pool-
ing layer is then fully connected to a sixteen-
node rectified linear unit layer, which is then 
fully connected to a two-node softmax layer. 
The output of this layer corresponds to a per-
centage of confidence that input payload was 
malicious or benign.  
Building upon this payload classifier, 
there is a slightly larger architecture to actu-
ally predict things for sessions of multiple 
packets, although the payload classifier has to 
be trained before this prediction can occur. 
This session classifier inputs all of the pack-
ets from a single session, passes all of the 
TCP packets through the payload classifier to 
get a prediction for each, aggregates these 
predictions into a malware score by adding 
all of the malicious prediction percentages 
and subtracting all of the benign prediction 
percentages, and divides this score by the 
number of packets input to get a final mal-
ware prediction that is independent of session 
length. What is produced is a single number 
score in the range [-1, 1] that corresponds to 
how strong a prediction the network has 
made on the session as to whether it is mali-
cious or benign. Positive scores indicate ma-
liciousness, negative scores indicate benig-
nity, and scores near zero either correspond 
to unseen data or low confidence predictions. 
This score can be used directly to predict 
whether a session is malicious or benign with 
everything below or equal to zero being clas-
sified as benign, but this score has also been 
used as a single heavy-duty input feature for 
the MLP as mentioned earlier.  
 
3.2 Payload Classifier Training 
The payload classifier was trained inde-
pendently of the MLP but in a similar manner 
that utilized undersampling. Instead of train-
ing on the sessions, the payload classifier first 
extracts all of the benign and malicious 
packet payloads from the data and randomly 
removes some of them until the ratio of be-
nign to malicious payloads is 1.25:1. Then, 
all of the remaining payloads are run in a ran-
dom order through the network to train it. 
Similar to the MLP network, the result should 
be a classifier that is biased towards picking 
benign classifications when it does not detect 
features that are clearly indicative of mali-
ciousness or benignity. 
 
4 Evaluation 
Several datasets were used to tune and 
bug test the MLP classifier both with and 
without the payload classifier. In order to 
keep the final results free of possible bias 
from hyperparameters or coding mistakes, 
the classifying program must be complete be-
fore introducing the final evaluation dataset 
and drawing conclusions from it. This section 
goes through the tests that were run to ini-
tially create the classifier and evaluate it 
against a wholistic malicious and benign IDS 
dataset. 
It should also be noted that for perfor-
mance reasons, any .pcap session that was 
larger than 10,000 packets was split into 
chronologically contiguous, non-overlapping 
increments of 10,000 packets before being in-
put into the MLP classifier. If any increment 
of a session was predicted as malicious, the 
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entire session was predicted as malicious, and 
this only counts towards one correct or incor-
rect prediction in the statistics. 
4.1 Initial Testing 
The first dataset that was used to test and 
tune the coding of the system was a combina-
tion of three separate datasets and was origi-
nally introduced in [17]. The first is called 
Contagio and is an amalgamation of 217 dis-
tinct samples of the malware executables pro-
ducing internet traffic that are captured in in-
dividual .pcaps [19]. The second is called 
ISCX IDS 2012, which is a simulated IDS da-
taset created by the UNB Canadian Institute 
for Cybersecurity [20]. The third is dubbed 
the Benign Binary dataset and is a collection 
of 60 HTTPS downloads of popular pieces of 
software that were monitored with tcpdump. 
Malicious and benign .pcaps were used di-
rectly from Contagio and Benign Binary 
while the benign .pcaps present in the ISCX 
2012 dataset were initially cut apart on a per-
session basis by SplitCap and then had 150 
samples randomly selected before usage [21]. 
Hyperparameters that were tested include 
payload classifier and MLP layers being var-
ied from 1 to 6, payload classifier layer sizes 
that were varied between 64, 128, and 256, 
payload classifier kernel sizes that were var-
ied from 2 to 6, MLP layer sizes that were 
varied between 16, 32, and 64, payload clas-
sifier and MLP optimization algorithms that 
were varied between Adam, RMSProp, and 
stochastic gradient descent, method of even-
ing input data that was varied between over-
sampling and undersampling, and amount of 
data used in training that was varied between 
1%, 10%, 30%, and 50%. The parameters 
were varied mostly independently because 
testing times were prohibitively long to test 
every combination, and it was noticed that 
the percentage of input data used only had a 
small effect on either classifier’s ability to 
correctly predict the testing set. In the end, 
about 10% of the data was used for training 
simply because the dataset had so few ses-
sions in it. 
By itself, the payload classifier achieved 
a significant F1 score of 0.7538 by predicting 
90.9% of the benign files and 65.99% of the 
malicious files in the testing set correctly. 
The MLP performed even better by itself by 
achieving an F1 score of 0.8988 by predicting 
85.64% of the benign files correctly and 
93.33% of the malicious files correctly. Un-
fortunately, adding the payload classifier as 
an extra input feature at this point did not 
show any discernable improvement to the 
classification accuracy of the MLP. Although 
the payload classifier undersampling could 
be altered to give it a near-perfect benign pre-
diction rate while still predicting malicious 
files at a rate >40%, it did not translate to 
picking up on any predictions that the origi-
nal MLP missed as was expected. 
 
4.2 Final Tests on CICIDS2017 Dataset 
After the classifier code, sampling 
method, and hyperparameters were finalized, 
the classifier was finally evaluated on the CI-
CIDS2017 dataset [4]. This dataset contains 
a wide variety of activity that was generated 
in a twelve-machine network over five days. 
The malicious activity included spans por-
tions of each of the last four days and can be 
categorized into (1) brute force password 
cracking attacks, (2) DoS attacks, (3) 
heartbleed attacks, (4) web attacks (brute 
force, SQL Injections, and XSS), (5) infiltra-
tion attacks (malicious Dropbox and flash 
memory downloads leading to port scans), 
(6) botnet attacks, (7) DDoS attacks, and (8) 
port scans [4]. The benign traffic included 
runs continuously throughout the five days 
and includes realistically profiled traffic over 
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HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email proto-
cols [4]. This dataset was distributed in five 
.pcaps, one for each day of traffic, which was 
prepared by using SplitCap to separate all of 
the sessions into five benign subcategories 
for each day’s benign traffic and eight mali-
cious subcategories for each of the attack cat-
egories listed [21]. 
For each test of the MLP, 5 sessions were 
randomly selected for the training set and 995 
sessions were randomly selected for the test-
ing set from each of six of the eight attack 
subcategories – the web attacks had the re-
maining 1186 sessions always picked for the 
testing set and heartbleed attacks were only 
included in the testing set because the dataset 
only included five of them. Furthermore, 20 
sessions were randomly selected for the train-
ing set and 1980 sessions were randomly 
selected for the testing set from both the 
Monday and Thursday benign subcategories, 
and only 2000 sessions of training data were 
randomly selected from the Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Friday benign subcatego-
ries. Five such tests were run both by using 
the MLP classifier with and without the pay-
load classifier. The payload classifier was in-
itially run by itself without the MLP, and alt-
hough it performed significantly better than 
random, it was not comparable to the inclu-
sion of header features. 
The results of the five runs using the MLP 
classifier without the payload classifier can 
be explicitly seen in Table 1; the percentages 
in each cell represent the number of correct 
predictions. The average F1 score was 
0.9488, the average attack detection rate was 
94.5%, and the average false positive rate 
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was 4.68%. The average classification time 
was about 0.41 seconds per megabyte, which 
is reasonable for modern home bandwidths 
but may need further optimization in a busi-
ness setting. 
The results of the five runs using the MLP 
classifier with the payload classifier can be 
seen in Table 2. The average F1 score was 
0.9480, the average attack detection rate was 
95.02%, and the average false positive rate 
was 5.44%. This is almost identical to the 
MLP without the payload classifier, but it 
took around fifteen times longer to train and 
test, so adding the payload classifier clearly 
has not improved the basic MLP. 
 For both classifiers, the predictions are 
generally very accurate across all subcatego-
ries, and each run’s accuracies are generally 
closely grouped across all subcategories ex-
cept for “Thurs. Infiltration Attacks and Port 
Scans.” Upon more detailed inspection of the 
data, it appears that this subcategory contains 
mostly port scans, which is the same as the 
second category with the lowest successful 
detection rates, “Fri. Port Scans.” Further-
more, the runs with the lowest port scan de-
tection rates generally seem to be the runs 
that have the fewest false positives. This 
makes it appear as though the features used 
are not sufficient to clearly identify port scans 
because these particular features are similar 
in port scans and some benign connections. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Using 27 basic network packet header 
features, the MLP presented in this paper was 
able to classify malicious and benign streams 
at a very high rate at a reasonable speed. Alt-
hough prior works were able to boast better 
accuracy, the MLP presented here used such 
a smaller portion of a more modern dataset 
for training that it is expected to be much 
more indicative of real-world usage. As such, 
network administrators can be more confi-
dent when looking at this data and deciding 
the costs in terms of false positives and neg-
atives when implementing a similar system to 
alert them of likely intrusions into their net-
works.  
Unfortunately, although the payload clas-
sifier technique presented was shown to be 
effective at other classification tasks besides 
intrusion detection in [10]and [11], it was un-
able to add anything to an MLP classifier. As 
it stands, the payload classification showed 
significance in being able to detect some at-
tacks by itself, but it was less accurate, more 
complicated, and about fifteen times slower 
to train and test than the MLP by itself. In 
fact, some sessions that had the densest pay-
loads took up to 95 times longer to classidy 
with the payload classifier. Future work 
might include attempting to find exactly what 
subcategories of traffic the payload classifier 
can effectively identify and incorporating it 
in a different manner into an IDS. 
Both classifier techniques also appeared 
to perform particularly poorly at detecting 
port scan attacks. Most of the classifier tests 
detected them at a fairly high rate, but remov-
ing port scans clearly would have improved 
on overall malicious detection rates and may 
have improved on benign detection rates if 
the cause of the problem is that port scans 
have very similar features to benign traffic. 
Evaluating the usage of a classifier like the 
presented MLP on everything but port scans 
while using some other method to detect port 
scans may be a fruitful avenue for future 
work to further increase accuracy. 
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